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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE 
DISTRICT COURT 
The caption of the case contains the names of all 
parties to the proceedings in the District Court. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Jurisdiction is based on §78-2a-3 (2) (k), U.C.A. (1953). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether plaintiff, a trust beneficiary, has 
established hostility between the trustee and her to give her 
standing to sue. 
2. Whether plaintiff established an exception to the 
bar of limitations that would otherwise apply if the claims were 
brought by the trustee. 
3. Whether defendants breached any duty by executing 
the trustee's written direction to make the account transfers and 
whether plaintiff established defendants had "actual knowledge" 
under Utah Code Ann. (1953) § 75-7-406 that the trustee's 
directions breached the Trust, if they did. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Each of the issues presented for review was determined 
by summary judgment. The standard of review is for correctness. 
Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
STATUTES AND RULES QF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
Those statutes and rules which are of importance to the 
appeal are set forth in the Addendum. 
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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff is a beneficiary of her husband Norman's 
trust. Her only child, James, is its trustee. She sues the 
trustee's stockbroker, Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. and its account 
executive, Ralph Pahnke, for executing in 1980 the trustee's 
written instructions to transfer the Trust assets to the 
trustee's personal account and to plaintiff's trust account. She 
has not sued the trustee. 
A Utah statute provides that, absent contrary "actual 
knowledge," a third party has no duty to probe whether the 
trustee is properly exercising trust powers. Defendants did not 
have "actual knowledge" the 1980 transfers breached the Trust, if 
they did. Failing to show "actual knowledge," plaintiff contends 
that because, when the Trust brokerage account was opened in 
1978, clerks examined the Trust Agreement to see who the trustee 
was and that he could deal in securities, defendants had actual 
knowledge the 1980 transfers breached the Trust's distribution 
provisions. 
Plaintiff believed from the outset that the Trust 
assets were her untouchable nest egg. In 1984, the trustee told 
her that he had borrowed against and had lost all the assets on 
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margin call. The news devastated her but she did nothing and 
waited more than six years to sue. 
CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES 
The complaint alleges four claims: (1) breach of 
contract; (2) tortious interference with contract; (3) breach of 
fiduciary duty; and, (4) negligence. Plaintiff seeks damages 
equal to the value of the stock sold to pay her son's loans. 
Defendants contend that undisputed facts of record 
show: (1) plaintiff lacks standing to sue; (2) all four claims 
would be barred by statutes of limitations against the trustee 
and no exception to the bar exists for plaintiff; and (3) 
defendants did not have actual knowledge of the trustee's alleged 
breach of trust, so their duty was to execute precisely the 
trustee's instructions to transfer the assets. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
In 1991, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint 
because plaintiff lacked standing. The trial court granted the 
motion. An amended complaint replaced Anna Lee as the 
named-plaintiff with a trustee, David M. Dudley. The trial court 
dismissed the amended complaint on grounds that his claims were 
time-barred. Anna Lee appealed. This Court reversed and 
remanded, holding "it is clear from the complaint the beneficiary 
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c o u l d p r o v e f a c t s showing she has s t a n d i n g . . . . " Anderson v . 
Dean W i t t e r R e y n o l d s . I n c . . 841 P .2d 742, 745 (Utah App. 1 9 9 2 ) , 
c e r t , d e n i e d . 853 P .2d 897 (1993) . The Cour t d i d n o t r e a c h t h e 
i s s u e of l i m i t a t i o n s . 1 
P l a i n t i f f p r o c e e d e d on t h e o r i g i n a l c o m p l a i n t . The 
p a r t i e s comple t ed e x t e n s i v e d i s c o v e r y . P l a i n t i f f f i l e d a 
c e r t i f i c a t e of r e a d i n e s s f o r t r i a l (R. 812) and moved f o r summary 
judgmen t . (R. 9 2 8 - 9 . ) Three weeks l a t e r , d e f e n d a n t s moved f o r 
summary judgmen t . (R. 1279-80 . ) The t r i a l c o u r t d e n i e d 
p l a i n t i f f ' s and g r a n t e d d e f e n d a n t s ' mo t ion , e n t e r e d a m i n u t e 
e n t r y e x p l a i n i n g i t s r u l i n g (R. 1641-2) and e n t e r e d on J u l y 1 1 , 
1994 a f i n a l Amended Order and Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc a s of June 
7, 1994 (R. 1 7 1 7 - 9 ) , from which p l a i n t i f f a p p e a l s . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
D e f e n d a n t s do no t d i s p u t e p l a i n t i f f ' s S t a t e m e n t of 
F a c t s t o t h e e x t e n t i t a c c u r a t e l y s t a t e s t h e r e c o r d , b u t i t o m i t s 
i m p o r t a n t u n c o n t r a d i c t e d f a c t s . De fendan t s make t h i s S t a t e m e n t 
of F a c t s f o r a c c u r a c y and c o m p l e t e n e s s . 
1
 "[The motion to dismiss the amended complaint] claimed a s t a t u t e of 
l i m i t a t i o n s ba r . Although Anna Lee Anderson a l so appealed the d i smissa l of 
the 'Amended Complaint , ' we need not reach t h a t i s sue because we a re r eve r s ing 
the d i smis sa l of the o r i g i n a l complaint ." I d . a t 744, n. 1. 
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Creation of Norman Trust. 
1. Norman Anderson's Trust Agreement, Anna Lee 
Anderson's Trust Agreement and their two wills were prepared by 
attorney Ronny Cutshall. On November 17, 1978, he mailed them to 
plaintiff and Norman with a detailed, letter describing their 
operation. Mr. Cutshall does not remember any conversations with 
the Andersons. (R. 1861, 2001-4.) 
2. Plaintiff and James discussed Norman's Trust when 
they reviewed Mr. Cutshall's letter. She understood what the 
instruments provided. She was concerned where Norman's assets 
would go on his death but, on reading Mr. Cutshall's letter and 
discussing it with James, she saw it was "taken care of." (R. 
1826-8.) 
3. Plaintiff knew James was Norman's and her trustee. 
James had graduated from college and plaintiff believed he ought 
to know what to do in handling trusts, and she trusted his 
business acumen. (R. 1826). She kept in her home copies of both 
wills and both trust agreements to look at whenever she wanted. 
(R. 1830:15-20.) 
4. Norman's Trust Agreement was signed November 20, 
and plaintiff's on November 28, 1978. 
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Opening of Brokerage Account for Norman Trust. 
5. On November 20, 1978, James, as trustee, opened a 
stock trading account for the Norman Trust with the Salt Lake 
City office of Dean Witter. Ralph Pahnke was the account 
executive for Dean Witter who assisted2 him. (R. 2118:15-18.) 
An account executive only gathers documents and forwards them on 
for administrative processing; the account executive cannot 
approve the opening of a new account. (R. 2150:6-21.) 
6. When the account was opened, James did not request 
nor did Pahnke agree that Dean Witter would undertake to 
supervise the Trust or the trustee. (R. 2252, % 5.) James does 
not remember any such discussion. (R. 1878:3-6.) 
7. When a new account was opened by a trustee for a 
trust, Dean Witterfs standard procedure was to request from the 
trustee a complete copy of the trust instrument and to send it to 
its San Francisco, California, Regional Operations Service 
Center, Office of Name and Address Control, Trust Desk, of which 
Kathy Barnett was supervisor in late 1978. (R. 2244, 1 7.) 
2
 The record does not show Pahnke was "engaged to manage" the account, 
as plaintiffs' Brief (at 7, 1 3) claims his deposition (R. 2118) shows. 
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8. James delivered a copy of Norman's Trust Agreement 
to Ralph Pahnke. Ralph Pahnke looked at parts of only the first 
and the last pages of the document to determine the name and date 
of the Trust and the identity of the trustee and to verify his 
signature. He did not then or ever read more of it; he had no 
reason to do so. He did not keep a copy of it. (R. 2119-21.) 
9. Ms. Barnett reviewed 50 to 100 trust instruments 
each day from 30 to 40 branch offices in several western states. 
She has no independent recollection of her review of Norman's 
Trust Agreement. (R. 1969-70, 1972.) 
10. In monitoring names and addresses for new 
accounts, it was Ms. Barnett's function, and the policy of 
the Trust Desk, to determine from a trust instrument: (a) the 
name of the trust; (b) its date; (c) the name and signature of 
the trustee; (d) the trustee's power to trade securities; (e) the 
provisions for amending the trust; and (f) the procedure for 
replacing a resigning trustee. (R. 2245, % 9; 1972:17-22; 
1977:12-25; 1981:14-25.) The Trust Desk did not approve nor 
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undertake 3 t o approve or disapprove of the t r u s t e e ' s d i s t r i b u t i o n 
p r o p o s a l s . 4 (R. 2246, W 12-14.) 
1 1 . Ms. Barnet t looked for the d e t a i l needed t o open 
the t r u s t account by scanning the paragraph headings in the 
ins t rument , s topping t o read only when the heading suggested i t . 
(R. 1980-1.) She would not read the e n t i r e t r u s t ins t rument 
because t h e r e was no reason to do so . (R. 2245, 1 10.) 
12. On November 29, 1978, Ms. Barne t t sen t a wire t o 
the S a l t Lake Ci ty o f f i ce ve r i fy ing the Norman Anderson Trust 
account name and approving i t for cash only t r a d i n g . (R. 2245-6, 
1 11 ; R. 2250.) Margin t r a d i n g had not been r eques t ed . (R. 1990.) 
Death of Norman and Probate. 
13. Norman Anderson died March 9, 1979. (R. 1870.) 
At torney Dean Gray probated the e s t a t e in 1979 and 1980. He could 
3
 Although i t was s tandard procedure t o reques t a complete copy of a 
t r u s t ins t rument , i f a t r u s t e e objected to producing the e n t i r e ins t rument , i t 
was e s t a b l i s h e d procedure for Dean Wit ter to accept a " p a r t i a l t r u s t , " 
c o n s i s t i n g of the f i r s t and l a s t pages and those pages dea l ing with s e c u r i t i e s 
t r a d i n g a u t h o r i t y , t r u s t amendment and t r u s t e e r e s i g n a t i o n . (R. 2222:28-30). 
I t was a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y e a s i e r to ask for a complete copy, r a t h e r than exp la in 
which p a r t i c u l a r pages were needed: "Unless we got a complete copy, of ten as 
not we would not get the necessary pages . " (R. 2209:1-7, 2210:6-11) . 
4 Al len Rockier, an indus t ry exper t , t e s t i f i e d s tandard i ndus t ry 
procedure on opening accounts i s to see who the t r u s t e e i s , t h a t he i s 
au thor ized t o deal in s e c u r i t i e s and the name of the t r u s t ; "Firms did not 
care about a t a l l - - none of them cared about what the d i s t r i b u t i o n p rov i s ions 
were in a t r u s t . " (R. 2142.) 
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not recall any of his conversations with James, and his file has 
been destroyed. (R. 2206.) Typically, he would review with a 
personal representative the distribution provisions of an 
applicable trust. (R. 2207-8.) 
14. Plaintiff understood Norman left at his death 
in his Trust account several million dollars worth of stock of 
Levi Strauss & Company. She never asked James what he was going 
to do with the stock or about distributing the estate. (R. 1835). 
Letter of Authorization 
15. On April 22, 1980, James went to see Pahnke. He 
said it was time to distribute the stock from his father's Trust. 
Pahnke asked him, "What would you like to take place?" James 
directed that 24,118 shares of Levi stock be transferred from the 
Norman Trust account to the Family Trust. James said he was the 
beneficiary of the Family Trust and, therefore, the stock should 
go to his existing personal margin account at Dean Witter. He 
told Pahnke that all of the remaining stock should go to the 
Marital Trust. He said his mother was the beneficiary of the 
Marital Trust, and, therefore, the stock should go into the 
existing margin account maintained for the Anna Lee Trust. (R. 
2253 1 10; 2124-7; 2128-31.) Pahnke told James that Dean Witter 
required a letter of authorization to transfer or "journal" 
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securities from one account to another. James dictated the 
letter of authorization to Mr. Pahnke at his desk, stating the 
detail of the transfers. Pahnke wrote James' instructions in his 
own handwriting, supplying technical words like "journaled" and 
"Type 1 account." The letter directed the transfer of 24,118 
Levi shares "to the Family Trust which is James Norman Anderson 
acct. no. 124-21818-1" -- i.e.f James1 existing, personal margin 
account. The letter further directed the remaining shares "should 
be distributed to the Marital Trust 124-25481-1-47" -- i.e.. the 
existing margin account for the Anna Lee Trust. James read it 
and signed it, "James Norman Anderson, trustee for the family 
trust and personal representative." Pahnke gave the letter to 
the branch cashier. He does not know what happens to such 
letters of authorization after they go to the cashier. (R. 
2128:16-22.) Pahnke had no reason to discuss with James whether 
the instructions were authorized by the Trust document and did 
not discuss that with him. He knew James had both an accountant 
and a lawyer assisting him on Trust matters. He had no knowledge 
whatever the distributions were improper, if they were, and he 
merely followed James' directions. (R. 2254, 1 12.) 
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16. James did not deny or refute Pahnke's testimony. 
James testified that he cannot recall5 what happened in their 
meeting: "I can't remember [what was said]. I just know the 
reason why, and this letter (of April 22, 1980) evidently allowed 
that to happen." (R. 1894-5, 1899, 1910-12.) 
Q: "Could it be that you told Ralph how many 
shares to put in one account and how many shares to put 
in the other account and don't remember it now? 
A. We could have talked about that." 
(R. 1905:15-18). He does not remember whether he asked if Pahnke 
had read the Norman Trust Agreement or if he had a copy of it. 
(R. 1908, 1913, 1928:11-22.) James read and signed the letter 
authorizing the transfers. (R. 1901:13-25.) James1 Affidavit 
says he "never questioned the propriety of the transfers" and was 
"entirely unaware the transfers violated the specific terms of 
the Norman Anderson Trust." (R. 223 9.) 
17. Dean Witter does not now have the working 
documents to show how the 1980 transfer transactions were handled 
or approved internally. (R. 1805.) Typical procedure, however, 
was that a letter of authorization would be forwarded by the 
branch cashier to one of forty to fifty credit (i.e.. margin) 
5
 Review of James' deposition (R. 1893-1913) shows James has virtually 
no memory of what was said and done on this occasion, other than that he 
signed the letter of April 22, 1980. 
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clerks in the San Francisco Regional Operations for review to see 
that the assets designated were available and to process the 
transfers. (R. 2207-8, 2221:14-16.) 
18. When a trustee directs that trust assets be 
distributed, Dean Witter performs no review. Greg Taylor, 
Witter's Regional Compliance Officer, testified: 
And the trustee will tell us where to journal assets. 
And we are not going to challenge the trustee as to 
whether or not the account receiving those assets is a 
beneficiary. That's the trustee's responsibility to 
determine who the beneficiaries are, not Dean Witter. 
(R. 2216:12-17.) It obtains from the trustee a written letter of 
authorization. If the trustee directs the transfer to existing 
accounts of beneficiaries, no additional steps are taken. (R. 
2224:5-14.) 
19. Expert Allen Rockier testified that the industry 
practice is for the broker to take the instructions from the 
trustee and to follow the instructions "to the letter without 
interrogation; we do not have any choice in that." (R. 2144-5.) 
Expert Edward D. Spurgeon, Dean of the University of Georgia Law 
School, experienced with trusts and stockbrokers, testified that 
it is not the practice of brokerages to inquire into a trustee's 
power to make distribution of trust assets. (R. 14:7-11.) 
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Account Activity. 
20. Over the next four years, James borrowed against 
the stock in the Anna Lee Trust and his personal accounts. The 
Levi stock had a low tax basis; margin borrowing allowed him to 
receive cash without selling the stock. (R. 2279-80.) James 
told his mother he had borrowed from her trust, margining the 
stock. Plaintiff herself regularly borrowed money from her trust 
account for routine living expenses, and she approved of James1 
borrowing money from it "whenever he needed it." (R. 1839:14-25; 
1856:10-12; 2284-6; 2289-94.) 
C \WPWIM60\WPDOCS\REL\DWR\APLBRFJO ANA 13 
21. Every month James received statements for the 
three Dean Witter accounts. He read them; he filed them at home. 
They showed all the transfers and margin activity in the 
accounts. (R. 1784-1812.) 
22. On May 16, 1980, James consulted with two tax 
advisers, Kent Demars and Stuart T. Matheson, an attorney, 
regarding estate planning. Matheson's notes show James requested 
a "detailed analysis" (R. 2050, 2086) and received a seven-page 
legal opinion analyzing Norman's Trust Agreement and opining that 
James had the exclusive right to direct the distribution of 
principal and income from the Family Trust, and therefore its 
assets were excluded from Anna Lee's personal estate. (R. 2042-
8:49-56.) Matheson kept a copy of Norman's Trust Agreement. (R. 
2026.) 
23. On May 28, 1980, James met with Matheson and 
discussed the Norman Anderson Marital and Family Trusts in 
connection with James1 closing of a purchase of a new $490,000 
home. They decided to place the title to the home 70% in the 
name of James Anderson as Trustee of the Anna Lee Anderson Trust 
and 3 0% in the name of James Anderson as Trustee of the James 
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Anderson Trust. The file contained a memo showing they discussed 
the need to "[w]ork up a game plan for . . . Goal: transfer 
$400,000 - from Anna Lee to Jim." (R. 2058, 2087.) 
24. The next day, May 29, 1980, James borrowed 
$250,000 on the Anna Lee Trust account (R. 1808) and $123,549.82 
on his account. (R. 1812). He used the money to purchase the 
home, placing the title in the 70%/30% split discussed with 
Matheson. (R. 1935.) Thereafter, James borrowed an additional 
$446,674.31 from the accounts for improvements on the home. 
(R. 1940-5.) 
25. On September 30, 1980, James' accountant, Teresa 
Scott, sent to him two completed "Form 1041, U.S. Fiduciary 
Income Tax Return" forms for 1979: one for the "Norman Anderson 
Family Trust" (R. 1946-50) and one for the "Norman Anderson 
Marital Trust." (R. 1950-6.) She apportioned the dividends on 
the Levi stock between the Marital and Family Trust returns. She 
testified her procedure would have been to review and outline the 
Norman Trust Agreement, but could not remember doing it and her 
files were destroyed. (R. 2156-8.) 
26. On April 9, 1981, James met for an hour and one-
half with Matheson and Kent DeMars. Mr. Matheson's note to the 
file states: "Jim and Kent will provide me with all of the 
accounting documentation regarding the source of funds both going 
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into Anna Lee and Jim's trust (in the estate of Norman Anderson) 
together with ledger accounting materials from the trust or 
trusts to Jim and/or Development Company." (R. 2083.) His 
handwritten note shows James received "21,000 shares of Levi from 
inheritances - Family Trust." (R. 2081, 2036.) Neither James 
nor Matheson can remember any of the conversations they had about 
Matheson's legal work in 1980 and 1981. Mr. Matheson's 
notes do not refer to any impropriety about the asset transfers 
from Norman's Trust to James' and Anna Lee's trust accounts. (R. 
2028:17; 2030:9; 2035:12-25.) 
In 1984, James Told Plaintiff of the Loss of All the Levi Stock. 
25. James told plaintiff in 1984 that all Levi stock 
in both accounts had been sold to repay the margin borrowing. 
(R. 1845-7; 1857:4-10.) She testified: 
Q. In late May 1984 and the first week of June of 
1984 all the Levi stock was sold to pay the bill in 
both your trust account and the stock that was in Jim's 
name, too. Jim talked to you about that in 1984? 
A. Sure. 
Q. Tell me as closely as you can recall the 
substance of what Jim said and what you said in that 
conversation? 
A. He told me what you just said. 
Q. What? 
A. That the stock had to be sold to cover our 
debt. 
(R. 1845-6.) 
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26. Plaintiff could not understand "where all that 
money disappeared to;" she felt "broke," "devastated"; 
"dumbfounded," "speechless," "sad." It was "overwhelming", "a 
state of shock"; "heartsick. Try it sometime." (R. 1846:7-9; 
1847:1-4; 1848:8; 184 9:15.) 
27. She believed the Levi stock in the Norman Trust 
was in her words, "untouchable." (R. 1856:8-9.) She testified: 
Q. All right, when Norman's estate was being 
probated [in 1979] by Dean Gray, you received notices 
from the court that he [James] had applied to the court 
through Dean Gray to have the estate probated, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Norman had died and you understood that he had 
Levi stock that was worth, say, a couple million 
dollars, right? 
A. Right. 
Q. You understood that Jim was the trustee for 
that stock? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you understood whatever was to be done with 
Norman's assets Jim was to do it? 
A. No. He wasn't to mess around with anything. 
That was a separate account. 
Q. Who did you think was to manage Norman's 
estate? 
A. I don't know. It wasn't to be monkeyed with. It 
was a trust. A separate affair. 
Q. But you didn't ask him any questions about it 
until we got to the arbitration in 1990? 
A. He didn't know either. 
Q. Well, did you ask Jim any questions about it 
until you got to the arbitration in 1990? 
A. What was there to ask? 
Q. Either you did or you didn't. 
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A. I didn't. 
Q. Okay. Now, why didn't you ask Jim anything 
about what was going to be done with Norman's assets? 
A. I don't remember. They were fine where they 
were. 
Q. Did you talk to him about that? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you ever tell him to leave the assets right 
where they were? 
A. No. 
Q. You just didn't discuss the subject at all, 
right? 
A. They weren't available to Jim or me. 
A. That was my nest egg. That should have been 
left alone. 
Q. Well, when he told you in June of 1984, he told 
you that all the stock was gone, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you then understand that all the money in 
both the marital trust and the family trust was gone --
I mean all the stock was gone? 
A. Yes. 
(R. 1834:19-23; 1835:7-20; 1836:21-4; 1837:1-25; 1838:1-3; 
1851:8-9; 1857:4-10.) 
28. Despite 1984's "devastating" news that her 
"untouchable nest egg" now was gone, Anna Lee did nothing. She 
did not talk with Ken Hanni, the attorney who had handled Anna 
Lee's and Norman's estate planning from 1971 through 1976. She 
did not talk to Bill Anderson, who had been the family accountant 
since the 60'S. She did not talk to Ronnie Cutshall, the 
attorney who had prepared the Norman Trust and written to her 
about it. She did not talk to Dean Gray, the attorney who had 
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probated Norman's estate. (R. 1847:8-25.) And, she did not talk 
to Ralph Pahnke, or to Dean Witter!s branch manager, or to any 
other Dean Witter representative about the loss. (R. 1848-9.) 
She told no one: 
Q. Did you talk to anybody about it? 
A. No. 
Q. Just kept it to yourself. Is there any reason 
why you didn't talk to anybody about it? . . . 
A. There's no reason. 
(R. 1849:4-7, 21.) 
A. I had no idea and I didn't ask. I cared, but 
caring and asking and knowing are something I should 
have been better at. 
(R. 1859:1-3.) 
29. James did not try to dissuade her from making an 
inquiry or contacting the professionals. (R. 1850:3-5.) James 
never hid anything from his mother. (R. 1929-30.) Anna Lee did 
not then, and has not since, made any claim against her son, whom 
she believes did nothing wrong: 
Q. Did he tell you whether or not he thought it 
was all right to take the money? 
A. No, he didn't say that. 
Q. Did he tell you that he thought he knew it was 
wrong? 
A. He didn't know it was wrong. It was there. 
(R. 1852:9-14; 1853:l-2.) 
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Arbitration Proceedings-
30. James and the Anna Lee Anderson Trust, through 
their present attorney, James E. Morton, filed suit in May 1987 
in federal court (James N. Anderson and the Anna Lee Anderson 
Trust v. Dean Witter Reynolds. Inc.: Case No. 87C-483A). The 
parties stipulated to arbitration. Plaintiff's affidavit 
volunteered that she "initiate[d] the federal lawsuit and 
ultimate arbitration proceeding." (R. 2235, 1 7, 14.) 
31. Arbitration hearings were conducted in December, 
1990 and in March, 1991. (R. 0236.) 
32. At the outset of the arbitration hearing on 
December 4, 1990 (R. 2259), the claimants commenced questioning 
about a new claim of improper transfers made by the April 1980 
letter of authorization.6 The arbitration panel found James' 
attempt to raise the improper transfer issue to be untimely, 
stating: 
[W]e're not going to allow i t [the l e t t e r of 
authorization] to be introduced for the purposes of 
ra i s ing a new claim at t h i s time. I don' t think a new 
claim i s timely made or proper at t h i s time so the new 
claim that you were describing to us we wi l l not be 
enter ta ined. 
6
 A year a f t e r James had closed the Dean Wit ter accounts , he obta ined 
from Dean Wit ter in September 1986 copies of documents which h i s lawyer t o l d 
the a r b i t r a t i o n panel included a copy of the Apri l 22, 1980 l e t t e r of 
a u t h o r i z a t i o n . (R. 1925:7-11; 2266:15-25.) 
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We believe your client had enough information that 
had he told you, you could have raised these claims 
earlier and didn't do so. 
(R. 2275:19-23, 2276:6-9.) This complaint by Anna Lee was filed 
on December 6, 1990 (R. 1-12.) 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENTS 
The crux of this action is the 1980 transfer of stock 
from the Norman Anderson Trust account to the Anna Lee Anderson 
Trust account and to James Anderson's personal account. 
Plaintiff's Brief (at 25) admits this case "turns on the 
propriety of [that] single isolated transaction." She claims the 
assets should not have been transferred from Norman's Trust 
account. (R. 1856:8-9.) 
Ralph Pahnke's role was to relay the letter of 
authorization to the branch cashier who sent it to the regional 
margin department, whose sole role was to execute the written 
instructions signed by the customer. (Facts %% 17-19.) Dean 
Witter correctly performed its duty to follow the customer's 
instructions. It transferred the assets to the accounts James 
intended to designate. 
The trial court correctly granted summary judgment to 
defendants on three grounds. First, plaintiff lacks standing to 
sue to recover the trust assets. Trusts operate through 
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trustees, not beneficiaries, and trustees' acts and omissions 
bind trusts; a beneficiary cannot sue on behalf of the trust 
unless there is demonstrated hostility with the trustee. 
Plaintiff has not shown, and the record disproves, requisite 
hostility between James and Anna Lee. 
Second, plaintiff's complaint is barred by limitations. 
The transfer claim arose in 1980; suit was not filed until 1990. 
The trustee is barred, and so is the beneficiary. There is no 
factual basis in the record to apply the exception permitting a 
beneficiary to sue a third party when the trustee and the third 
party knowingly participate in breaching the trust. Furthermore, 
plaintiff is barred by laches from pursuing her claim because she 
waited more than six years, while records were destroyed and 
witnesses' memories faded, to sue for a loss she admittedly knew 
in 1984 should not have occurred. 
Third, plaintiff's claims fail on the merits. She does 
not pursue on appeal claims for breach of contract or tortious 
interference with contract. She has not shown any promise was 
made to her or to the trustee by defendants or by third parties 
which defendants breached or with which they interfered. 
Her negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims fail 
because she produced no witness to establish any industry 
22 
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standard of practice, nor to show defendants breached any-
standard; defendants showed no standard was breached. These 
claims also require a finding that defendants breached a legal 
duty by executing James1 instructions to transfer the Norman 
Trust assets. In fact, no such duty was breached as a matter of 
law. Under the Utah Uniform Trustee's Powers Act, absent "actual 
knowledge that the trustee is exceeding his powers or improperly 
exercising them," defendants may "assume without inquiry" that 
the trustee is acting within his authority and, therefore, they 
cannot be liable for executing his instructions. Plaintiff cannot 
show defendants had "actual knowledge" of any breach of trust. 
Defendants' duty was to obey the trustee's instructions. 
Plaintiff's only claim is that, had they studied the Norman 
Anderson Trust Agreement, defendants would have reached the legal 
conclusion that the Agreement did not authorize the trustee to 
order the transfers. The premise is not true. Even if it were 
true, constructive knowledge is not the same as actual knowledge, 
and it is the latter which is required. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. PLAINTIFF AS A TRUST BENEFICIARY LACKS STANDING. 
Trusts act through trustees, not beneficiaries. 
Trustees' acts and omissions bind trusts and subject them to 
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limitations defenses. Claims to recover trust assets ordinarily 
belong to trustees. Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 281 (set 
forth in Addendum D). The Court of Appeals in Anderson v. Dean 
Witter Reynolds. Inc., 841 P.2d 742, 745 (Utah App. 1992) cited a 
limited exception to the general rule: 
[T]he beneficiary has the right to bring an action 
against a third party when the beneficiary's interests 
are hostile to those of the trustee. 
The Court cited Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 282(2) (set 
forth in Addendum E) giving a beneficiary standing to sue the 
third party and the trustee in equity if the trustee "improperly 
refuses or neglects" to sue. It held, for the Rule 12(b) (6) 
motion to dismiss before it, that ". . . it is clear from the 
complaint the beneficiary could prove facts showing she had 
standing. . ." Xd. at 745. This case is past the pleading stage. 
Now, after completion of discovery, plaintiff's certification of 
readiness for trial and both sides1 motions for summary judgment, 
the record shows conclusively that plaintiff cannot prove facts 
showing she has standing; it shows conclusively no hostility 
existed between plaintiff and James. Hence, the exception does 
not apply, and plaintiff's suit was correctly dismissed for lack 
of standing. 
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Any hostility between James as trustee and his mother 
as beneficiary would arise only if it were true that James 
neglected to bring suit against Dean Witter because he knew his 
transfer instructions were improper and he hesitated to impugn 
his own conduct. In fact, however, both James and plaintiff have 
insisted James did not know he did anything wrong and that he did 
nothing wrong. James' Affidavit (H 5-6) declared he was 
"unaware that the transfer violated the specific terms of the 
Norman Anderson Trust." (R. 2239.) Anna testified James did not 
know it was wrong to take the money and that she is not pointing 
any fingers at him. Facts 1 29. That does not establish 
hostility; it negates it. £££. Velez V, Feinstein# 87 A.D.2d 309, 
451 N.Y.S.2d 110, 115 (1982). 
Moreover, the record shows not that James hesitated to 
act for the Trust, but that he was willing to take whatever 
action was necessary to recover Trust assets. When James1 
attorney belatedly thought in 1990 that the Norman Anderson Trust 
might have a claim, James immediately sought to pursue it at the 
inception of the arbitration hearing. Facts %% 30-32. When 
their effort was denied for untimeliness by the arbitrators, the 
trustee's attorney within two days filed this lawsuit in the name 
of the beneficiary while he continued to assert the trustee's 
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claims in arbitration. Their use of the same attorney belies any 
claim of hostility or conflict of interest between this mother 
and this son. Plaintiff has failed to meet the opportunity 
previously given by this Court to "prove facts showing she has 
standing" to recover trust assets.7 
Plaintiff's Brief (at 40) cites § 282(2) of the 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts. It does not help her. First, 
plaintiff has not sued the trustee.8 Second, this is an action 
at law for damages, not a suit in equity as required. Third, she 
has not established in the record that the trustee did anything 
"improper." She says, "[t]he only inquiry relevant" to standing 
is whether the trustee neglected to sue for ten years. 
(Plaintiff's Brief at 39; emphasis hers.) She rests solely on 
the lapse of time, making no effort to demonstrate the existence 
of a genuine issue of fact that the trustee "improperly 
neglected" to sue by showing that his conduct amounted to 
hostility toward her. Her simplistic reading of this Court's 
7
 Plaintiff's Brief (at 40) relies on § 327 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Trusts as authority for standing, but that section deals with limitations 
and laches, not standing. 
8
 Restatement (Second) of Trusts, comment e on subsection 2 of § 282 
(quoted in addendum E), makes it clear the beneficiary's suit in equity is 
"against the trustee to compel him to perform his duty" and in such suit, a 
third party may be joined. 
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prior decision would destroy the limitations defense; under her 
reading, limitations could never run against beneficiaries' 
claims. Hostility is required, as this Court's prior decision 
said. Id. at 745. The record demonstrates affirmatively there 
is no hostility. Now, past pleading, after extensive discovery 
and on the eve of trial, in the face of defendants' showing, 
plaintiff cannot point to any facts in the record to make an 
issue of standing. The trial court correctly denied her motion 
for summary judgment and granted defendants' motion. 
POINT II. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS RUN AGAINST THE TRUSTEE 
AND THE BENEFICIARY ON ALL CAUSES QF ACTION-
A. Limitations Have Run Against The Trustee. 
Generally, limitations begins to run on the happening 
of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action. 
United Park City Mines v. Greater Park City Co.. 870 P.2d 880, 
890 (Utah 1993) . Here, the claim is that defendants should not 
have transferred assets out of the Norman Anderson Trust account. 
Each cause of action was complete when the transfer occurred in 
1980. The statutes of limitations for claims on breach of 
contract9 and for interference with contract, negligence and 
breach of fiduciary duty10 all expired on April 22, 1984. This 
9
 Utah Code Ann. (1953) § 78-12-25(1). 
10
 Utah Code Ann. (1953) § 78-12-25(3). 
11 
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suit was not brought until December, 1990. All causes of action 
are barred. 
James knew the assets of Norman's Trust account were 
transferred in 1980 out of it and into Anna Lee's Trust account 
and his personal account. He knew they were not transferred into 
non-existent accounts denominated "Norman Anderson Family Trust" 
and "Norman Anderson Family Trust." (R. 1866-7.) He received 
and reviewed monthly statements showing precisely the names of 
the accounts to which the assets were transferred and he raised 
no objection. (Facts % 21). The assets, therefore, were 
transferred precisely as the trustee had intended; Dean Witter 
made no mistake. 
As trustee, James had available to him all of the 
information and documents necessary to determine whether the 
Norman Trust instrument permitted transfers out of it. He also 
consulted a host of professional advisors, all of whom had copies 
of, and all of whose work depended on a review of, the Norman 
Trust agreement and Dean Witter's monthly statements. Because 
James knew all relevant facts pertaining to the 1980 transfers 
and is bound to have known the consequences, limitations started 
running against him as trustee on April 22, 1980 and he would be 
barred if he sued on plaintiff's claims. 
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B. The Beneficiary Did Not Establish Any Of The Three 
Elements For An Exception To The Bar Of 
Limitations! 
Where, as here, the statute of limitations bars suit by 
the trustee against a third party, the beneficiary is barred, 
too. Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 327(1) z11 see Interfirst 
Bank-Houston. N.A. v. Quintana Petroleum Corp.. 699 S.W.2d 864, 
874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1985). The Restatement provides an exception 
to this rule only if the beneficiary can establish: (1) the 
trustee knowingly breached the trust, (2) the third party 
knowingly participated in the breach, and (3) the beneficiary is 
not barred by laches. Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 327(2). 
Plaintiff fails all three tests. 
a. The Trustee Did Not Knowingly Breach The 
To fit within the exception, the beneficiary first must 
show that the trustee himself knowingly breached the trust. 
But upon reason and authority where (the third party 
transferee) and the trustee had no actual knowledge of 
the breach, and acted innocently, though illegally, the 
statute of limitations runs against the trustee and if 
barred as to him also bars the cestui que trust. The 
text finds support in the cited authorities as well, we 
think also in sound reasoning. 
See Addendum F. 
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Spann v. First Nat'1 Bank of Montgomery. 240 Ala. 539, 200 So. 
554, 558 (1941). James has sworn voluntarily in his affidavit 
that he did not believe, and had no knowledge until 1990, that 
his instructions to transfer the assets violated the Norman 
Trust. (R. 2239, H 5-6.) 
b. Defendants Did Not Have Actual Knowledge The 
Trustee Breached His Trust. 
Under § 327(2) of the Restatement, a beneficiary must 
also prove that the third party knowingly participated with the 
trustee in the breach; that means actual knowledge of the breach. 
It is not enough the third party "could have" known or even 
"should have" known of the breach. Adler v. Manor Health Care 
Corp. 7 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1116, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 732, 735 
(1992). 
In Jones v. Idaho. 91 Idaho 823, 432 P.2d 420 (1967), a 
mother held real property in trust but sold it in breach of trust 
terms. A successor trustee and the beneficiaries sued the 
buyers, who pleaded limitations. The beneficiaries claimed the 
buyers had notice of the terms of the trust because it had been 
recorded. The Court rejected the constructive notice argument: 
The fact, however, that he had such notice did not 
prevent the statute of limitations from running. If 
that were so, the statute would cease to be one of 
30 
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repose. The statute will run in favor of even a 
wrongdoer. 
Id. at 426. See al££ Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Ross. 781 
F. Supp. 415, 418-19 (M.D.N.C. 1991) (liability of third party 
for knowing participation in breach of duty by ERISA fiduciary 
must be based on knowledge at the time of the transaction that it 
amounted to a breach of trust). 
Here, as detailed below in Point III, it is undisputed 
that neither Dean Witter nor Pahnke had actual knowledge James 
was committing a breach of trust -- if in fact he did -- merely 
by executing James' instructions to transfer the assets. 
Plaintiff argues that, because James had provided Dean Witter 
with a complete copy of the Trust instrument when he opened the 
Norman Trust account in 1978, defendants could, or even should, 
have known the 1980 transfers were improper. But, as Jones 
teaches, constructive notice is not "knowing participation." 
c. Plaintiff's Claims Are Barred by Laches. 
Plaintiff also fails the third element of the 
Restatement's exception because she is guilty of laches. As one 
leading authority explained, 
A beneficiary cannot sit idly by and close his eyes to 
what is going on around him. "One who would repel the 
imputation of laches on the score of ignorance of his 
rights must be without fault in remaining so long in 
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ignorance of those rights. Indolent ignorance and 
indifference will no more avail than will voluntary 
ignorance of one's rights." As a Pennsylvania court 
has said: "Laches is not excused by simply saying: 'I 
did not know.' If by diligence a fact can be 
ascertained the want of knowledge so caused is no 
excuse for a stale claim. The test is not what the 
plaintiff knows, 'but what he might have known, by the 
use of the means of information within his reach, with 
the vigilance the law requires of him.111 
G. Bogert, Trusts & Trustees. § 949 at 531 (rev. 2d ed. 1982). 
The elements of laches are (1) claimant's lack of diligence, and 
(2) resulting injury to defendant. Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah 
Division of State Lands, 802 p.2d 720, 731 (Utah 1990). 
Plaintiff admits she believed her "nest egg" in the 
Norman Trust should not have been touched. (R. 1856.) It is 
likewise undisputed that by June 1984 she knew that all of those 
assets had been transferred out of that trust when she was told 
they had been liquidated to repay James' loans. Facts 11 47-49. 
She need not be aware of all details to put her on inquiry 
notice .12 
u
 Warren v. Provo Citv. 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992), United Park 
City Mines v. Greater Park City Co.. 870 P.2d 880, 890 (Utah 1993)("sufficient 
knowledge to put them on inquiry"); O'Neal v. Division of Family Services. 821 
P.2d 1139, 1144 (Utah 1991) ("threshold showing that he or she did not know 
and could not reasonably have known"); Leggroan v. Zion's Savings Bank & Trust 
Co.. 120 Utah 93, 101-02, 232 P.2d 746, 750 (1951) (facts "should have lead 
the cestuis as reasonable men to think that the trust estate was almost entirely 
gone"),- Hackforfl
 Yi First Security Bank, 521 F. supp. 541, 559-60 & n.22 (D. 
Utah 1981) (notice charged when facts are available), aff'd. No. 81-1863, 
unpublished slip, op., 1983 WL 20180 (10th Cir.), cert, denied. 464 U.S. 827 
(continued...) 
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Knowledge that the "untouchable" had been completely 
taken put her on duty to exercise reasonable diligence to ask 
"why?" and "how?" One fully informed of such facts as would put 
a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry but who 
makes no inquiry "is deemed to have discovered all that would 
have been revealed. . . . " Koulis v. Standard Oil of Calif.. 746 
P.2d 1182, 1185 (Utah 1987). 
Despite having access to a host of legal and accounting 
advisors, plaintiff asked no one why the assets, which she 
insists were "untouchable," were taken. Plaintiff simply has no 
excuse for the six-year delay between learning the assets were 
gone and filing suit. It is her burden to show she took 
reasonable steps to investigate. O'Neal v. Division of Family 
Services. 821 P.2d 1139, 1144 (Utah 1991). She admits she took 
no steps at all. Plaintiff's Brief (at 46) argues that the "one, 
single piece of information" the professionals and plaintiff 
lacked to "unlock the mystery" of James' breach of trust was the 
1980 letter of authorization. There was no "mystery" about it. 
The subsequent monthly account statements showed the executed 
l2(... continued) 
(1983); Bayou Bend Towers Council of Co-Owners v. Manhattan Construction Co., 
866 S.W.2d 740, 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1993) ("All that is required to commence 
the running of the limitations period is the discovery of an injury and its 
general cause, not the exact cause in fact and the specific parties responsible.") 
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transfers from the Norman Trust account into the Anna Lee trust 
account and into James' personal account and so must have their 
tax returns. Facts % 31. Plaintiff admits: "[The accountants] 
had access to [Dean Witter] account statements. . . They 
understood the distribution provisions in the Norman Anderson 
Trust." (Plaintiff's Brief at 46.) Far from being "the key," 
the letter of authorization was unnecessary to her "discovery." 
Given her now claimed conviction that her "nest egg" was 
"untouchable," she only had to know one new thing to alert her in 
1984 to investigate: that the stock in Norman's Trust account 
was gone. It mattered not to whom, why or how it was gone. She 
knew it should not have been touched. It was she, however, who 
kept her now claimed conviction to herself and did not reveal it 
to others, including the professionals. It was her conviction 
that was "the key." Reading in 1990 the April, 1980 letter of 
authorization would have revealed nary a single new fact not 
fully reported by Dean Witter's 1980 monthly statements. 
Plaintiff's lack of diligence has severely damaged and 
prejudiced Dean Witter. Important documents have been lost and 
memories of key witnesses have faded since the transactions 
occurred in 1980, precluding explanation of how they were made 
and what understanding the Andersons and their professionals had 
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of them. Did p la in t i f f approve, condone or r a t i fy the t ransfers? 
James has forgotten important meetings with a l l of the various 
attorneys and accountants. None of them can remember any of the 
conversations they had with James, though the i r notes and 
documents show they occurred. See Facts ff 26. 
Lost papers include the 1980 Norman Anderson Family 
Trust income tax return prepared by Teresa Scott (which successor 
accountant Mel Christofferson's notes re f lec t he reviewed in 1985 
(R. 1999)) and the annual balance sheets Teresa Scott says she 
prepared "as a normal course" along with tax returns for t r u s t 
c l i e n t s . (R. 2186-7.) 
At t h i s l a t e date, there i s no longer any way to 
determine the extent these professionals discussed with James the 
legal , administrat ive or p rac t ica l considerations which led James 
to d i rec t the t ransfers and what Anna Lee knew or could see about 
his conduct.13 
Other destroyed documents s i g n i f i c a n t to show who knew about and 
approved of the t r a n s f e r include Dean W i t t e r ' s wires , order t i c k e t s , margin 
t i c k e t s and o ther r e l evan t memoranda. Witnesses with l i t t l e or dimmed memory 
on the subjec t include James Anderson, Anna Lee Anderson, S tua r t Matheson, 
Dean Gray, tax adviser Kent Demars, accountant Teresa Scot t , of Webb, Anderson 
& Co. Facts 11 23, 63. For laches , one need not show the test imony of 
wi tnesses with dimmed memory would have been favorable . Gerhard v. Stephens. 
442 P.2d 692 (S.C. Cal. 1968), n. 44. 
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d. Plaintiff's Excuses Fail. 
Plaintiff's Brief (at 20) argues her claims were 
concealed from her by defendants, but she points to no fact that 
was concealed nor to any misleading statement by defendants. The 
concealment she claims was that defendants did not disclose the 
dubious legal conclusion that a breach of trust had occurred. 
How could they? James and defendants did not know of any breach 
or that such claim would be made. One cannot conceal what one 
does not know. Dean Witter's monthly statements disclosed every 
single relevant material fact concerning its activities on these 
accounts. Dean Witter's duty was to disclose facts to its 
customer, James Anderson as trustee and for himself, and it did 
just that. 
Plaintiff's Brief (at 41) claims limitations do not run 
until plaintiff learns or should learn the facts giving rise to 
the action, citing Klinger v. Knightly. 792 P.2d 868, 869 (Utah 
1990). Plaintiff's reliance is misplaced. In the first place, 
the issue here is whether plaintiff has shown diligence in 
pursuit of facts to prove she is not barred by laches to avoid 
the trustee's bar of limitations; it is not when did limitations 
begin to run. Second, Klinger makes it clear the discovery rule 
is an exception to the normal application of the statute of 
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limitations. The "discovery rule" exception could not apply 
here. Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86, (Utah 1981) notes the 
"governing policy" is that statutes of limitations 
. . . are designed to promote justice by preventing 
surprises through the revival of claims that have been 
allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, 
memories have faded and witnesses have disappeared. 
It teaches that mere ignorance of a cause of action does not 
prevent the running of limitations. Plaintiff presents no facts 
or argument, as in Klinger dealing with discovery of an improper 
survey, to establish that this is an exceptional situation where 
application of those general rules would be unjust. She cannot 
do it, given Dean Witter's accurate monthly statements reporting 
all facts and her six year old knowledge of loss. 
Plaintiff argues (her Brief at 21) that as a 
beneficiary her duty of inquiry was limited. The point is 
irrelevant here: she is barred because the trustee is barred, 
unless she establishes the three elements of the Restatementfs 
exception, one of which is her diligent inquiry. Moreover, she 
failed as a matter of law to exercise any diligence. See Andress 
v. Condos. 672 S.W.2d 627, 630-31 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984) (the 
existence of a fiduciary relationship does not eliminate the 
requirement of reasonable diligence; limitations runs from date 
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of inquiry notice; and summary judgment on limitations can be 
appropriate as a matter of law). 
Plaintiff's sole case cited for an excuse (her Brief at 
21) is Eisenbaum v. western Energy Resources, Inc./ 218 cal. App. 
3d 314, 267 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1990). There, the seller of a limited 
partnership interest lied in writing to the buyer, representing 
the transaction was legal. The court held limitations did not 
begin to run until the buyer consulted his attorney, but that was 
because the only fact which could have been discovered about the 
representation was that the legal conclusion expressly given was 
incorrect. Eisenbaum does not stand for the proposition 
advanced: a beneficiary need not sue until told by counsel she 
has a claim. Here, plaintiff cannot prove defendants 
misrepresented or concealed any fact. 
The statute of limitations began to run against the 
trustee on April 22, 1980, and expired four years later. 
Plaintiff has failed to establish any of the three elements 
extending limitations for a beneficiary under Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts, § 327(2), so her claims, too, were barred on 
April 22, 1984, as a matter of law. 
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POINT III. DEAN WITTER AND RALPH PAHNKE DID NOT BREACH ANY 
DITTY RY EXECUTING JAMES' INSTRUCTIONS TO TRANSFER 
THE TRUST ASSETS. 
Plaintiff's Brief (at 25) admits "this case turns on 
the propriety of a single, isolated transaction in April, 1980." 
Defendants agree. If that transfer were wrongful, plaintiff 
would have a claim against James for breach of trust. But it 
certainly does not follow she also has a claim against Dean 
Witter and Pahnke. A stockbroker's duty is to obey the 
customer's instructions -- exactly as Dean Witter and Pahnke did 
here. (R. 2144-5). To hold Dean Witter and Pahnke legally 
responsible for the allegedly wrongful transfer, plaintiff must 
establish the reverse of the usual rule: i.e.. that Dean Witter 
and Pahnke had the duty not to follow their customer's 
instructions. This she cannot do. 
Section 7 of the Utah Uniform Trustee's Powers Act 
(Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-406 (1953)) provides: 
With respect to a third person dealing with a trustee 
or assisting a trustee in the conduct of a transaction, 
the existence of trust power and their proper exercise 
by the trustee may be assumed without inquiry. The 
third person is not bound to inquire whether the 
trustee has power to act or is properly exercising the 
power; and a third person, without actual knowledge 
that the trustee is exceeding his powers or improperly 
exercising them, is fully protected in dealing with the 
trustee as if the trustee possessed and properly 
exercised the powers he purports to exercise. A third 
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person is not bound to assure the proper application of 
trust assets paid or delivered to the trustee. 
That was taken verbatim from § 7 of the Uniform Trustees' Powers 
Act. It was enacted to protect third parties in their dealings 
with trustees. Horowitz, Uniform Trustee's Powers Act. 41:1 
Wash. L. Rev. 1, 4 and 28 (1966). At common law, third parties 
who dealt with a trustee were bound to inquire into the 
limitations of a trustee's powers. If they failed to inquire, 
they were charged with constructive knowledge of the information 
they might reasonably have discovered. This potential exposure 
made third parties justifiably reluctant to deal with a trustee 
for fear the trustee might exceed trust powers. To remove those 
fears and to promote dealings with trustees, the Uniform Law 
Commission adopted § 7 of the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act. Xd. 
at 1. It affords protection to third parties by expressly saying 
they are not to be charged with constructive knowledge of 
limitations on the power of a trustee; they lose that protection 
only if they have actual knowledge of a trust breach by the 
trustee.14 Its purpose is noted by a leading treatise on trusts: 
In dealing with this question of liability for taking 
part in a transfer of securities, the legislatures have 
14
 Plaintiff concedes the statute "immunizes third persons from a 'duty 
of inquiry.'" (Her brief at 31). 
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adopted the arguments made by corporations and their 
transfer agents and other interested businessmen that 
it is unreasonable to put a duty of inquiry on the 
intermediary who effects the transfer, since he is not 
paid for an investigating service and to require it of 
him would be burdensome, time-consuming and expensive. 
G. Bogert, Trusts & Trustees. § 905, at 308-09 (rev. 2d ed. 1982). 
Thus, as a matter of law, Dean Witter and Pahnke were 
entitled to "assume" James was acting within his authority in 
giving his instructions. They had no. duty to determine 
whether in fact the trust instrument gave him that authority. 
Under § 75-7-406, they were "fully protected" in following James' 
instructions unless they had "actual knowledge" he was not 
properly exercising his authority. The record is barren of any 
evidence of actual knowledge. To prove actual knowledge, 
plaintiff must establish defendants (1) read the distribution 
terms of the trust and (2) actually formed the conscious 
conclusion that the April 1980 transfers violated the trust. The 
record affirmatively shows lack of such knowledge. 
Every single witness, whether party, employee or 
professional, has testified he or she did not know James 
improperly exercised his powers. Plaintiff has offered no 
evidence to contradict them; she has not offered any witness to 
testify there was a breach of the Trust. Indeed the 
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uncontradicted record establishes that Dean Witter, through Ralph 
Pahnke or Kathy Barnett, did not know of a breach of trust. The 
uncontradicted record establishes that it is not known which Dean 
Witter margin clerks handled the 1980 transaction because those 
records now are gone (Facts 1 17), but industry practice shows 
they certainly would not have considered the propriety of the 
trustee's directions. (Facts % 19.) 
Being unable to offer any evidence of actual knowledge, 
plaintiff argues that Dean Witter and Pahnke could, or should, 
have known that the transfers violated the Trust merely because 
the Trust instrument had been delivered to Dean Witter a year and 
a half earlier. No witness testified Dean Witter should have 
known. Plaintiff's argument of a breach fails for two reasons: 
first, the premise is not correct, and, second, constructive 
knowledge is not enough. 
The uncontradicted testimony of experts shows that 
anyone reading the distribution provisions of the trust 
instrument would not invariably conclude it prohibited the 
transfers. Trust expert Dean Edward Spurgeon15 opined that one 
15
 Dean Spurgeon's credentials include J.D. Stanford, 1964; Masters 
Degree in Taxation, N.Y.U., 1968; 1968-1980, partner in Los Angeles with Paul 
Hastings Janofsky & Walker; Professor of Law, University of Utah, 1983-1990, 
and Dean; now Professor of Law and Dean of Law School, University of Georgia. 
(continued...) 
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reading Norman's Trust Agreement and the letter of authorization 
would not necessarily have known the transfers violated the 
dispositive provisions of the Trust. (R. 2198.) He explained 
that the beneficiary could have requested the trustee to make "a 
distribution of any or all of those (marital) assets to herself 
or someone else, and "that can be done." (R. 22 03.) He 
testified it is the practice of some trustees to carry title to 
trust assets in their own name. (R. 2204.) Stockbroker 
compliance expert Joan Lavell (R. 2024) testified that even as to 
known trust assets, "there is no way for a brokerage firm to 
define what a trustee is doing other than to follow the trustee's 
instructions," so that a trustee may hold the trust assets in any 
name he chooses, "and to commingle" them. "If [a known trust] 
account was established in the name of an individual, [the 
broker] would treat it as it would any other individual account." 
(R. 2014:17-19; 2015:19-25.) 
Actual experience buttresses those opinions. James' 
lawyer (Stuart Matheson) and three C.P.A. firms (Coopers & 
Lybrand; Bill Anderson and Teresa Scott; and Greg and Mel 
15(...continued) 
He is experienced with the brokerage industry as a lawyer representing 
investors and personal account holders; he is a specialist in estate and trust 
administration; and, he is a lawyer for fiduciaries. (R. 2189-93). 
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Christofferson) each used Norman's Trust instrument and 
defendants' monthly account statements to render professional 
services about distribution of the Trust assets; yet none of them 
ever raised any notion that the transfers violated the trust. 
(Plaintiff's Brief at 46). If they did not know the assets 
should not have been transferred out of Norman's Trust, why then 
should defendants be charged with knowledge that such was a 
breach when they did not even read the distribution provisions of 
the Trust? 
Second and more important, under § 75-7-406 even if 
defendants could be charged with knowledge, constructive 
knowledge is insufficient to subject them to liability. As one 
commentator put it, 
It is to be noted that constructive knowledge, as 
distinguished from actual knowledge, is not enough. 
Therefore, mere suspicion that limitations exist or 
knowledge of facts which, if pursued, would show that 
limitations exist do not deprive a third person of this 
protection. 
Horowitz, supra at 28-29; See al££ Richards v. Platter Valley 
Bank, 866 F.2d 1576 (10th Cir. 1989) (reversing judgment against 
bank because the verdict was based on "actual notice" rather than 
"actual knowledge" as required under the Uniform Fiduciaries 
Act); Sontag v. Stix. 199 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1947) (requiring actual 
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knowledge); Scott on Trusts. § 326.5 at 314-5 (4th ed. 1989) 
(actual knowledge, and not jus t circumstances that would put the 
th i rd party on notice, must be proven).16 
Pla in t i f f thus f a i l s to ra i se a t r i a b l e issue 
suff ic ient to withstand summary judgment. See J e t t v. Sunderman, 
840 F.2d 1487, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988) (summary judgment proper in 
aiding and abet t ing case because defendants submitted 
declarat ions s ta t ing they did not have knowledge of primary 
v io la t ion and p l a i n t i f f ' s declarat ions fai led to ra i se any 
genuine issue as to that f a c t ) . 
Given that p l a in t i f f has fai led to es tab l i sh that the 
1980 t ransfers to the exis t ing Anna lee t ru s t and James1 personal 
margin accounts were actual ly known by defendants to breach 
Norman's Trust Agreement, the issue of margining in the Norman 
Anderson Trust i s i r re levan t . P la in t i f f complains about the 
t ransfers out of Norman's Trust, not margining in the t ransferee 
To p r e v a i l on such a theory, the benef i c i a ry must show t h a t , in 
add i t ion to having ac tua l knowledge, the t h i r d pa r ty was ac t ing to fu r the r i t s 
own p r i v a t e f i n a n c i a l gain r a t h e r than to serve the i n t e r e s t s of i t s c l i e n t , 
the t r u s t e e . See Pierce v. Lyman. 1 Cal. App. 4th 1095 (1991). Dean Wit ter 
earned normal commissions on the stock purchases and s a l e s ordered by James. 
Nothing was earned on the May 8, 1980, t r a n s f e r s . See Monthly Statement for 
May 1980 (R. 1802-3). But the r e c e i p t of fees for p ro fess iona l s e rv i ces does 
not c o n s t i t u t e the kind of personal f inanc ia l i n t e r e s t requ i red to render a 
t h i r d p a r t y l i a b l e for p a r t i c i p a t i n g in a n o t h e r ' s breach of t r u s t . See 
Skarbrevik v. Cohen. England & Whitf ield. 231 Cal. App. 3d 692, 710 (1991). 
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accounts. Her claim is the same whether James sold the stock and 
took the cash out or whether he took the cash out by borrowing 
against the assets. 
Furthermore, plaintiff has not established that those 
assets could not be margined or that to do so breached any 
industry standard of practice. All experts have testified to the 
contrary. Defendants' internal policies -- issued to guide clerks 
-- prove nothing. The internal policy "exceeds industry 
standards" and margin borrowing in Norman's Trust was 
permissible, expert Lavel testified. (R. 2018-9.) The margin 
borrowings from the Norman Anderson Trust account were limited to 
$40,000 (R. 1784) and $35,000 (R. 1786) on May 29 and June 8, 
1979 respectively, after James signed a margin agreement for the 
Norman Anderson Trust account on May 29, 1979. (R. 1812A17.) 
Neither is there any showing that defendants formed a 
conclusion that to permit margining was a breach of the Norman 
Trust agreement; trustee power to borrow is statutorily given in 
Utah under Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-402(3)(s). The great bulk of 
the margining was from the Anna Lee Trust's and James' accounts, 
which plaintiff does not claim to have been improper. Dean 
17
 This sheet was not paginated. 
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Spurgeon testified that even if a firm is aware a trust document 
does not expressly authorize the trustee to margin assets, it 
does not have to require the trust be amended to show specific 
authority to borrow because the trustee still may have implied 
power to margin the assets. A trustee has those implied 
statutory powers as may be necessary in his judgment to act as a 
prudent man, so if the trustee in good faith thought it prudent 
to margin assets, then the trustee would have the power to do so. 
(R. 2195-6.) Paragraph (1) of the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act 
mirrors in Utah the prudent man rule of practice enunciated by 
Dean Spurgeon. 
Without citing any applicable authority plaintiff's 
Brief (at 32) claims "actual knowledge" is an affirmative defense 
defendants must disprove. That is patently wrong. The Uniform 
Trustees' Powers Act, Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-406, establishes that 
proper exercise of a trustee's power may be "assumed without 
inquiry" absent "actual knowledge" to the contrary. This change 
in common law was made because "[w]ithout this section, third 
persons might never safely deal with a trustee for fear that he 
was exceeding his trust powers under the prudent man rule." 
Horowitz, supra at 28. Plaintiff's proposition is that unless 
the third party proves lack of actual knowledge, actual knowledge 
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will be imputed. That oxymoron is precisely the opposite result 
the Uniform Act intends; gone would be the "assumption without 
inquiry" rule enacted to speed up commerce. The statute 
establishes the scope of the duty third parties gave to trustees; 
since showing a breach of duty is always part of plaintiff!s 
case, plaintiff has the bruden to prove all elements of breach, 
including "actual knowledge". see Commercial Savings Bank v, 
Baum. 137 Colo. 538, 327 P.2d 743, 745 (1958) (under the Uniform 
Fiduciaries Act, "The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to 
establish actual knowledge and bad faith.") That the defendant 
in Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp., 7 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 9 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 732 (1992), like defendants here, made a record showing 
of no actual knowledge does not mean they had the burden to do 
so, as plaintiff's Brief (at 35) implies; to the contrary, 
plaintiff in Adler alleged defendant had "actual or constructive 
knowledge" trust powers had been exceeded, but failed to prove 
actual knowledge as required. 
CONCLUSION 
Dean Witter had no duty to and was not paid to 
investigate, to cross examine, nor to weigh the propriety of the 
transfers, the loans, or the trustee's power to make them. 
Defendants did not receive a dime for making the transfers. 
48 
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Defendants were not James' lawyer, accountant, or estate planner; 
they were stockbrokers, and they did only what stockbrokers are 
expected to do. 
How ironic it is that plaintiff blames Ralph Pahnke, a 
pure order taker for the transfers in 1980 and for each loan. He 
simply relayed the customer's instructions to Dean Witter's San 
Francisco regional office. 
Notice how no blame is placed on James, who received 
large amounts of the family assets. James had independent legal 
and accounting advice, completely unrelated to Dean Witter, about 
different options for dealing with the trusts, making loans from 
the trusts, and filing tax returns for the trusts. If her son 
did nothing wrong, as plaintiff says, then no one did anything 
wrong. But if the transfers in fact violated the terms of the 
Norman Trust, then James and the Anna Lee Trust improperly 
received distributions of Trust assets, have been unjustly 
enriched, and it is they to whom plaintiff must look for return 
of the assets. 
Plaintiff does not have standing to pursue the action 
because she cannot prove hostility between her as beneficiary and 
James as trustee. Moreover, her complaint is barred by 
limitations because the statute began to run when the transfers 
49 
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were made in 1980 and suit was not filed until 1990. Since the 
record shows neither the trustee nor Dean Witter had actual 
knowledge of a breach of trust, and since plaintiff herself is 
guilty of laches, she cannot avail herself of the exception to 
the limitations bar. 
Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke did not breach any duty by 
following James' instructions to transfer the Norman Trust 
assets. They are entitled to the full protection of § 75-7-406 
of the Utah Uniform Trustees' Powers Act. Since neither 
defendant had actual knowledge James was exceeding his authority 
as trustee in making the transfers, they had no duty to second-
guess his instructions and thus cannot be held liable for 
"knowingly participating" with James in any breach of trust. 
The trial court's granting of defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment dismissing the complaint should be affirmed. 
DATED: July 11, 1995. 
MOYLE 8c DRAPER, P.C. 
By 
Joseph J. Palmer 
Reid E. Lewis 
Attorneys for Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc. and Ralph 
Pahnke 
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ADDENDUM A 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-402. Powers of trustees conferred by this 
part. 
(1) From time of creation of the trust until final 
distribution of the assets of the trust, a trustee has the power 
to perform, without court authorization, every act which a 
prudent man would perform for the purposes of the trust, 
including the powers specified in Subsection (3). 
(2) In the exercise of his powers, including the 
powers granted by this part, a trustee has a duty to act with due 
regard to his obligation as a fiduciary, according to the 
standard set forth in Section 75-7-302. 
(3) A trustee has the power, subject to Subsections 
(1) and (2) to: 
(q) hold property in the name of a nominee or in other 
form without disclosure of the trust so that title to the 
property may pass by delivery, but the trustee is liable for 
any act of the nominee in connection with the property so 
held; 
(s) (i) borrow money to be repaid from trust assets or 
otherwise; 
(t) (i) pay or contest any claim; 
(ii) settle a claim by or against the trust by 
compromise, arbitration, or otherwise; and 
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(x) effect distribution of property and money in 
divided or undivided interests and adjust resulting 
differences in valuation; 
(z) prosecute or defend actions, claims, or 
proceedings for the protection of trust assets and of the 
trustee in the performance of his duties; 
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ADDENDUM B 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-406. Third persons protected in dealing 
with trustee. 
With respect to a third person dealing with a trustee 
or assisting a trustee in the conduct of a transaction, the 
existence of trust power and their proper exercise by the trustee 
may be assumed without inquiry. The third person is not bound to 
inquire whether the trustee has power to act or is properly 
exercising the power; and a third person, without actual 
knowledge that the trustee is exceeding his powers or improperly 
exercising them, is fully protected in dealing with the trustee 
as if the trustee possessed and properly exercised the powers he 
purports to exercise. A third person is not bound to assure the 
proper application of trust assets paid or delivered to the 
trustee. 
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ADDENDUM C 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-408. Uniformity of interpretation. 
This part shall be construed to effectuate its general 
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact the 
Uniform Trustees' Powers Act. 
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ADDENDUM D 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 281. Action at Law by 
Beneficiary. 
(1) Where the trustee could maintain an action at law 
or suit in equity or other proceeding against a third person if 
the trustee held the trust property free of trust, the 
beneficiary cannot maintain an action at law against the third 
person, [subject to an inapplicable exception in subparagraph 
(2)] . 
Comment on Subsection (1): 
(a) The interest of the beneficiary of a trust is an 
equitable interest, and ordinarily is protected by suits in 
equity rather than by actions at law. This is true not only of 
the remedy of the beneficiary against the trustee (see § 197), 
but also of the remedy of the beneficiary against a third person. 
As to suits in equity by the beneficiary against a third person, 
see § 282. 
(b) Tort claims. If a third person commits a tort with 
respect to the trust property, the beneficiary, if he is not in 
possession, cannot maintain an action at law against him. . . 
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ADDENDUM E 
Restatement (Second of Trusts) § 282. Suit in Equity by 
Beneficiary, 
(1) Where the trustee could maintain an action at law 
or suit in equity or other proceeding against a third person if 
the trustee held the property free of trust, the beneficiary 
cannot maintain a suit in equity against the third person, except 
as stated in Subsections (2) and (3). 
(2) If the trustee improperly refuses or neglects to 
bring an action against the third person, the beneficiary can 
maintain a suit in equity against the trustee and the third 
person. 
Comment on Subsection (1): 
a. Ordinarily the interest of the beneficiary is protected 
against third persons acting adversely to the trustee through 
proceedings brought against them by the trustee and not by the 
beneficiary. As long as the trustee is ready and willing to take 
the proper proceedings against such third persons, the 
beneficiary cannot maintain a suit in equity against them. 
b. Tort claims. If a third person commits a tort with 
respect to the trust property, the beneficiary cannot maintain a 
suit in equity against him, except under the circumstances stated 
in Subsections (2) and (3). Thus, if land is held in trust and a 
third person wrongfully enters upon or damages the land, or if 
chattels are held in trust and a third person wrongfully takes 
them away or damages them, the beneficiary cannot maintain a suit 
in equity against him. 
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Comment on Subsection (2): 
e. Where the trustee fails to sue. If the trustee fails 
to perform his duty to bring an action at law or suit in equity 
or other proceeding against a third person (see § 177), the 
beneficiary can maintain a suit in equity against the trustee to 
compel him to perform his duty. In order to settle the 
controversy in a single suit and avoid multiplicity of suits, the 
beneficiary can join the third person with the trustee as co-
defendants, and the matter will be disposed of in a single suit. 
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ADDENDUM F 
Restatement (Second of Trusts) § 327. Rights of Beneficiary When 
Trustee Barred by the Statute of Limitations or Laches. 
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), if the trustee 
is barred by the Statute of Limitations or by laches from 
maintaining an action against a third person with respect to the 
trust property, the beneficiary is precluded from maintaining an 
action against the third person. 
(2) If the third person knowingly participated in a 
breach of trust, the beneficiary is not precluded from 
maintaining an action against him therefor, unless 
(a) the beneficiary is himself guilty of laches, or 
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